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Abstract
A natural deduction system for intuitionistic predicate logic with ex-
istential instantiation rule presented here uses Hilbert’s ǫ-symbol. It is
conservative over intuitionistic predicate logic. We provide a complete-
ness proof for a suitable Kripke semantics, sketch an approach to a nor-
malization proof, survey related work and state some open problems. Our
system extends intuitionistic systems with ǫ-symbol due to A. Dragalin
and Sh. Maehara.
1 Introduction
In natural deduction formulations of classical and intuitionistic logic existence-
elimination rule is usually taken in the form
∃xA(x)
A(a)
...
C
C
∃−
where a is a fresh variable Existential instantiation is a rule
∃xA(x)
A(a)
∃i
where a is a fresh constant. It is sound and complete (with suitable restric-
tions) in the role of existence-elimination rule in classical predicate logic but is
not sound intuitionistically, since it makes possible for example the following
derivation:
C → ∃xA(x), C ⇒ ∃xA(x)
C → ∃xA(x), C ⇒ A(a)
∃i
C → ∃xA(x)⇒ C → A(a)
C → ∃xA(x)⇒ ∃x(C → A(x))
⇒ (C → ∃xA(x))→ ∃x(C → A(x))
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There are several approaches in the literature to introduction of restrictions
making this rule conservative over intuitionistic predicate calculus.
We present an approach using intuitionistic version of Hilbert’s epsilon-
symbol and strengthening works by A. Dragalin [1] and Sh. Maehara [4] where
ǫ-terms are treated as partially defined. Then a survey of extensions and re-
lated approaches including important paper by K. Shirai [12] is given and some
problems are stated.
We do not include equality since in this case adding of ǫ-symbol with natural
axioms is not conservative over intutionistic logic ([5, 11]). A simple counterex-
ample due (in other terms) to C. Smorynsky [13] is
∀x∃yP (x, y)→ ∀xx′∃yy′(Pxy&Px′y′&(x = x′ → y = y′))
In our natural deduction system NJǫ axioms and propositional inference rules
are the same as in ordinary intuitionistic natural deduction, the same holds for
∀-introduction. The remaining rules are as follows:
Γ⇒ ∃xF (x)
Γ⇒ F (ǫxF (x))
∃i
(1)
existential instantiation,
Γ⇒ t ↓ ∆⇒ ∀zF (z)
Γ,∆⇒ F (t)
Γ⇒ t ↓ ∆→ F (t)
Γ,∆⇒ ∃zF (z) (2)
where
ǫxA(x) ↓:= ∃y(∃xA(x)→ A(y)), (3)
and t ↓:= ⊤ (the constant “true”) if t is a variable or constant.
Two semantics are given for NJǫ, or more precisely to an equivalent Gentzen-
style system IPCǫ (Section 2). The first semantics, which is incomplete but
convenient for a proof of conservative extension property over IPC is defined in
Section 3.
The second semantics with a completeness proof for IPCǫ is given in Section
4.
Section 5 presents a sketch of a possible proof of a normal form theorem.
Section 6 surveys some of the previous work and Section 7 outlines some open
problems.
2 Gentzen-style system IPCǫ
Let us state our Gentzen-style rules for the intuitionistic predicate calculus
IPCǫ with ǫ-symbol. For simplicity we assume that the language does not have
function symbols except constants. Formulas and terms are defined by familiar
inductive definition plus additional clause:
If A(x) is a formula then ǫxA(x) is a term.
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Derivable objects of IPCǫ are sequents Γ ⇒ A where Γ is a finite set of
formulas, A is a formula. This means in particular that structural rules are
implicitly included below.
First, let’s list the rules of the intuitionistic predicate calculus IPC without
ǫ-symbol.
Axioms:
Γ, A⇒ A, Γ,⊥ ⇒ A .
Inference rules:
Γ⇒ A Γ⇒ B
Γ⇒ A&B
⇒ &
A,B,Γ⇒ G
A&B,Γ⇒ G
&⇒
A,Γ⇒ G B,Γ⇒ G
A ∨B,Γ⇒ G
∨ ⇒
Γ⇒ A
Γ⇒ A ∨B
⇒ ∨
Γ⇒ B
Γ⇒ A ∨B
Γ⇒ A B,Γ⇒ G
A→ B,Γ⇒ G
→⇒
A,Γ⇒ B
Γ⇒ A→ B
⇒→
Γ⇒ A(t)
Γ⇒ ∃xA(x)
⇒ ∃
Γ⇒ A(b)
Γ⇒ ∀xA(x)
⇒ ∀
A(b),Γ→ G
∃xA(x),Γ ⇒ G
∃ ⇒
A(t),Γ→ G
∀xA(x),Γ ⇒ G
∀ ⇒
Γ→ C C,Γ⇒ G
Γ→ G
Cut
For IPCǫ quantifier-inferences ⇒ ∃, ∀ ⇒ are modified by requirement that the
term t substituted in the rule should be “defined” (cf. (3)).
Γ⇒ t ↓ F (t),∆⇒ ∆
∀zF (z),Γ,∆⇒ ∆
∀ ⇒
Γ⇒ ∆, t ↓ Γ→ ∆, F (t)
Γ⇒ ∆, ∃zF (z)
⇒ ∃
(4)
∃ ⇒-rule is also changed for IPCǫ:
A(ǫxA(x))Γ ⇒ G
Γ, ∃xA(x)⇒ G
∃ǫ ⇒
(5)
A routine proof shows that IPCǫ is equivalent to a Hilbert-style system obtained
by weakening familiar axioms for quantifiers to
(ǫQ1) t ↓ &∀xA(x)→ A(t)
(ǫQ2) t ↓ &A(t)→ ∃xA(x)
and adding the axiom
∃xA(x)→ A(ǫxA(x))
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2.1 Equivalence of IPCǫ and NJǫ
Let us remind that in natural deduction a sequent
A1, . . . , An ⇒ A
is used to indicate that A is deducible from assumptions A1, . . . , An.
Theorem 1 A sequent is provable in NJǫ iff it is provable in IPCǫ.
Proof. The proof is routine: every rule of one of these systems is directly
derivable in the other system. Let’s show derivations of the rules ∃i and ∃ ⇒
from each other using abbreviation e := ǫxF (x).
Γ→ ∃xF (x)
F (e)⇒ F (e)
∃xF (x)⇒ F (e)
∃ ⇒
Γ⇒ F (e)
∃xF (x)⇒ ∃xF (x)
∃xF (x)⇒ F (e)
∃i
F (e),Γ⇒ G
Γ⇒ F (e)→ G
∃xF (x),Γ⇒ G
3 A Kripke Semantics for Intuitionistic ǫ-symbol
To prove that IPCǫ is conservative over IPC we present an incomplete semantics
modifying a semantics from [1]. The main modification is in the definition of
t ↓ and treatment of atomic formulas containing ǫ-terms ǫxA.
Definition 1 Let w be a world in a Kripke model. Denote
ǫxA(x) ↓ w :≡ w |= ǫxA(x) ↓ .
We say that a term ǫxA is defined in w iff ǫxA(x) ↓ w.
Symbol ⊥ in in next definition indicates the condition (6) below.
Definition 2 An intuitionistic Kripke ǫ⊥-model (or simply model in this sec-
tion)
M = (W,<,D, |=, V )
has to satisfy the following conditions:
(W,<) is a Kripke frame with a strict partial ordering <,
D is a domain function assigning to every w ∈ W a non-empty set D(w)
monotone with respect to <,
w |= A is a relation between worlds w ∈ W and atomic formulas A with
constants from
D := ∪w∈WD(w)
monotonic with respect to ≤ and such that
w 6|= A if A contains at least one constant in D −D(w). (6)
V is a valuation function assigning a constant V (e, w) ∈ D to any ǫ-term e
(possibly containing constants from D) and w ∈ W .
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The relation |= is extended to composite formulas in the familiar way. The
components of an ǫ-model have to satisfy following conditions.
V (ǫxB(x, ǫyC), w) = V (ǫxB(x, V (ǫyC,w)), w), (7)
w |= A(ǫyC)↔ w |= A(x, V (ǫyC)), (8)
where substitution of ǫyC is safe, that is no free variable of ǫyC becomes bound.
Also
if e ↓ w for a term e := ǫxA(x), then
V (e, w) ∈ D(w) and V (e, w′) = V (e, w) for every w′ ≥ w.
Note once more that an atomic formula P (d1, . . . , dn) is false in a world w if at
least one of di is not in D(w).
This leads to incompleteness, for example formula
P (ǫxP (x))→ ∃xP (x)
is valid: if ǫxP (x) is undefined in a world w then the premise is false in w,
otherwise the conclusion is true. However this formula is not derivable, since it
implies (C → ∃xP (x))→ ∃x(C → P (x)).
The proofs of the next lemmata are routine.
Lemma 1 Let t be a closed term, A a closed formula with constants from D.
Then
w ≤ w′ → (t ↓ w → t ↓ v′& (w |= A→ w′ |= A))
Proof. Simultaneous induction on t, A.
Lemma 2 If Γ is a set of formulas, G a formula then Γ ⊢ G in IPCǫ implies
Γ |= G.
Proof. Induction on derivations. Checking the rule ∃ ⇒ uses the fact that
∃xA(x) implies ǫxA(x) ↓. It may be interesting to check whether any other
properties of the formula t ↓ are used. ⊣
Theorem 2 If A,B formulas without ǫ-symbol then A ⊢ B in IPCǫ implies
A ⊢ B in intuitionistic predicate logic IPC.
Proof. We need to prove that for every Kripke model
M0 = (W,<,D, |=0)
for intutionistic predicate logic refuting A→ B there is an IPCǫ-model refuting
A→ B. Before applying the construction from [1], let us recall a refinement of
a completeness theorem for intuitionistic predicate logic IPC.
Lemma 3 The following additional requirements to the definition of Kripke
frame (W,<,D) for IPC are still complete:
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1. W is a countable tree with a root 0 such that each w ∈ W except 0 has
unique immediate <-predecessor and the number of predecessors of w is
finite.
2. domains D(w) are strictly increasing: if w < w′ then D(w) is a proper
subset of D(w′).
Proof. The requirement 1 is satisfied by the canonical proof search tree for a
given sequent, see for example [8]. To satisfy the second requirement, note that
an infinite branch of the canonical proof search tree does not have “leaf worlds”:
for every w ∈ W there exists a w′ > w. Now take a fixed element e ∈ D(w0)
and duplicate it by a fresh element, say ew in every world w. More precisely for
the new domain function D′ define
ew ∈ D
′(w) −D′(w−),
where w− is the immediate predecessor of w. Let’s extend the relation |= by
identifying ew and e, more precisely define for atomic formulas P (c1, . . . , cn)
with constants ci ∈ D
′(w)
w |= P (c1, . . . , cn) := w |= P (c
−
1
, . . . , c−n )
where c−i = e, if ci = ew and c
−
i = ci otherwise. It is easily proved by induction
on formulas that this property extends to all formulas:
w |= A(c1, . . . , cn) implies w |= A(c
−
1
, . . . , c−n )
so that the new model verifies (and refutes) the same formulas. ⊣
Proof of the Theorem 2. We extend the model for IPC satisfying the pre-
vious Lemma by the definition of values for ǫ-terms without changing domains
D(w), which is done by induction on construction of the term. Assume that
the elements of D are well-ordered by a relation ≺ in some arbitrary way. In
view of the condition (7) it enough to define V (ǫxA,w) when ǫxA does not have
proper non-closed ǫ-subterms. In that case,
if ǫxA(x) ↓ w, take the <-minimal element v ≤ w such that ǫxA ↓ v, then
define
V (ǫxA(x), w) := the ≺-first d ∈ D(v)(v |= (∃xA(x)→ A(d)))
If not ǫxA(x) ↓ w, define V (ǫxA(x), w) as the ≺-first d ∈ D −D(w). ⊣
4 Completeness proof for IPCǫ
We prove that removing condition (6) but preserving familiar monotonicity re-
quirement
w ≤ w′ → (w |= A→ w′ |= A) (9)
leads to a complete semantics for IPCǫ.
For simplicity consider term models where individual domain D(w) for every
world w consists of terms, and evaluation function for terms is identity: value
of a term t is t. In particular the value of ǫxA is ǫxA.
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Definition 3 An intuitionistic Kripke (term) ǫ-model (or simply ǫ-model)
M = (W,<,D, |=, V )
has to satisfy the following conditions.
(W,<) is a Kripke frame with a strict partial ordering <,
D is a domain function assigning to every w ∈ W a non-empty set D(w)
(of terms) monotone with respect to <,
w |= A is a relation between worlds w and atomic formulas A with constants
from
D := ∪w∈WD(w)
monotonic with respect to ≤ .
V is a valuation function assigning a constant V (e, w) ∈ D to any ǫ-term e
(possibly containing constants from D) and w ∈W . (In a term model V (e, w) =
e).
The relation |= is extended to composite formulas in the familiar way. The
components of an ǫ-model have to satisfy following conditions.
V (ǫxB(x, ǫyC), w) = V (ǫxB(x, V (ǫyC,w)), w) (10)
w |= A(ǫyC)↔ w |= A(x, V (ǫyC)) (11)
where substitution of ǫyC is safe, that is no free variable of ǫyC becomes bound.
Also if e ↓ w for a term e := ǫxA(x), then
V (e, w) ∈ D(w) and V (e, w′) = V (e, w) for every w′ ≥ w.
Let’s present a completeness proof along familiar lines.
Definition 4 An infinite sequent is a pair of sets Γ,∆ of formulas such that
there is an infinite number of variables not in Γ ∪∆. An infinite sequent w is
written as Γ⇒ ∆ and notation
wa := Γ, ws := ∆
is used for its antecedent and succedent.
Lw denotes the set of all terms and formulas with free variables and constants
occurring in formulas of w.
D(w) is the set of all terms t ∈ Lw such that (t ↓) ∈ wa. In other worlds
D(w) consists of all free variables and constants in w plus all ǫ-terms ǫxA(x)
such that ∃y(∃xA(x)→ A(y)) ∈ wa.
An infinite sequent w is consistent, if it is underivable, that is if no finite
sequent Γ⇒ ∆ with Γ ⊂ wa, ∆ ⊂ ws is derivable in IPCǫ.
A consistent infinite sequent w is maximal consistent if wa∪ws is the whole
set of formulas in Lw.
Lemma 4 Every consistent infinite sequent w0 can be extended to a maximal
consistent sequent.
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Proof. Enumerate all formulas containing only free variables and constants in
Lw0 , then add them one by one to wa or ws preserving consistency. At the n-th
stage of this process a sequent wn, an extension of w0 by a finite number of
formulas is generated.
It cannot happen that at some stage n of this process a formula A fits none
of wna , w
n
s , i.e., both of
wna ⇒ w
n
s , An An, w
n
a ⇒ w
n
s
are inconsistent, since in that case wna ⇒ w
n
s is inconsistent by a cut rule. ⊣
Important example. If w is ∀xP (x)⇒ P (ǫxQ(x)) with P 6= Q, and the first
“undecided” formula is ∃y(∃xQ(x) → Q(y)) then this formula is added to the
succedent, since adding it to the antecedent results in an inconsistent sequent.
Lemma 5 Every maximal consistent infinite sequent w is closed under invert-
ible rules of multiple-succedent version of IPCǫ, that is under all rules except
⇒ ∀,⇒→. More precisely
(A&B) ∈ wa implies A ∈ wa and B ∈ wa,
(A→ B) ∈ wa implies A ∈ ws or B ∈ wa,
(A ∨B) ∈ wa implies A ∈ wa or B ∈ wa,
(∀xA(x)) ∈ wa implies (∀t ∈ D(w))(A(t) ∈ wa)
(∃xA(x)) ∈ wa implies A(ǫxA(x)) ∈ wa
(A ∨B) ∈ ws implies A ∈ wa and B ∈ wa,
(A&B) ∈ ws implies A ∈ wa or B ∈ wa,
(∃xA(x)) ∈ ws implies (∀t ∈ D(w))(A(t) ∈ ws)
Proof. Suppose (A&B) ∈ wa. If A 6∈ wa then by maximalityA ∈ ws. Therefore
w is inconsistent.
Suppose ∀xA ∈ wa. If A(t) 6∈ wa for some t ∈ D(w) then by maximality
A(t) ∈ ws. Therefore ∀xA ⇒ A(t) is derived by one application of the ∀ ⇒-
rule, and hence w is inconsistent. Note that additional premise t ↓ of this rule
is available by t ∈ D(w).
Other cases are similar. ⊣
Definition 5 For infinite sequents w,w′ define
w < w′ iff wa ⊆ w
′
a and D(w) ⊆ D(w
′)
Lemma 6 The set of maximal consistent sequents is closed under non-invertible
rules ⇒→,⇒ ∀. More precisely,
For every maximal consistent sequent w, if (A→ B) ∈ ws then there exists
a maximal consistent sequent w′ > w with A ∈ w′a, B ∈ w
′
s.
For every maximal consistent sequent w, if ∀xA(x) ∈ ws then there exists
a maximal consistent sequent w′ > w with A(a) ∈ w′s for some variable a,
a ∈ D(w′).
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Proof. If (A → B) ∈ ws then the sequent A,wa ⇒ B is consistent, since
otherwise one application of the rule ⇒→ leads to inconsistency of w. Now
extend A,wa ⇒ B to a complete consistent sequent.
If ∀xA(x) ∈ ws then the sequent wa ⇒ A(a) for a fresh variable a is consis-
tent, since otherwise one application of the rule ⇒ ∀ leads to inconsistency of
w. Now extend A,wa ⇒ B to a complete consistent sequent. ⊣
Definition 6 (Canonical model) Consider the following model
M = (W,<, V, |=).
W is the set of all maximal complete sequents, <, V are as above,
w |= A iff A ∈ wa for atomic formulas A.
This definition implies that w 6|= A for atomic A ∈ ws, since otherwise w is
inconsistent.
Lemma 7 The relation |= for atomic formulas and the function D is mono-
tonic.
Proof. Consider only D(w). Let w < w′. All variables and constants in
D(w) are in D(w′) by the definition of <. Assume ǫxA(x) ∈ D(w), that is
ǫxA(x) ↓ ∈ wa. Then ǫxA(x) ↓∈ w
′
a by w < w
′, and hence ǫxA(x) ∈ D(w′).
⊣
Lemma 8 For every formula A ∈ Lw
1. A ∈ wa implies w |= A,
2. A ∈ ws implies w 6|= A,
Proof. Induction on formulas using Lemmata 5,6. For example, if A&B ∈ wa
then A,B ∈ wa, therefore w |= A,w |= B by induction hypothesis, and hence
w |= A&B.
If ∀xA ∈ ws then there exists w
′ > w such that A(a) ∈ w′s for some variable
a ∈ D(w′). Therefore w′ 6|= A(a) and hence w 6|= ∀xA(x). ⊣
Theorem 3 The system IPCǫ is sound and complete.
Proof. Soundness is checked as before. For completeness take arbitrary under-
ivable formula A, then extend sequent ⇒ A to a maximal consistent set w. By
previous Lemma w 6|= A. ⊣
5 Cut-free Formulation, Normal Natural Deduc-
tion
It is plausible that completeness proof for the rules with cut given in a previous
section 4 can be modified to provide completeness of a cut-free formulation.
As our examples above show, complete cut-elimination is impossible. One has
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to admit cuts for formulas of the form ǫxA(x) ↓ where ǫxA(x) occurs in the
conclusion. The following proof where e := ǫxP (x) is an example.
∃xP (x)⇒ e ↓ ¬P (e), P (e), ∃xP (x)⇒ P (0)
∀x¬P (x), P (e), ∃xP (x) ⇒ P (0)
∀x¬P (x), P (e)⇒ ∃xP (x)→ P (0)
∀x¬P (x), P (e)⇒ ∃y(∃xP (x)→ P (y))
∃y(∃xP (x)→ P (y))⇒ e ↓ ¬P (e), P (e)⇒
∃y(∃xP (x)→ P (y)), ∀x¬P (x), P (e)⇒
∀x¬P (x), P (e)⇒
cut
Let’s outline a possible proof that this restriction is complete.
First, the definition of the canonical model should be modified along the
lines of a proof by M. Fitting [2] (cf. also [8]). Our definition of a complete
consistent sequent in the section 4 requires that such a sequent w contains every
formula of its language Lw as a member of its antecedent or succedent. This
requirement is weakened as follows.
For any formula F in Lw either F ∈ wa∪wb or there is a clash: both sequents
wa ⇒ wb, F and F,wa ⇒ wb
are cut-free derivable. This should provide completeness of a multiple-sequent
cut-free formulation. Then equivalence to a cut-free one-succedent formulation
should be proved by pruning and permutation of inferences as in [8]. Finally cut-
free one-succedent derivations are transformed into a normal natural deductions
as in [7].
6 Comparison with Previous Work
6.1 System IPCΩǫ
Let ∃ǫxA(x) := ∃xA(x).
A. Dragalin’s system IPCΩǫ from [1] for a given language Ωǫ is obtained by
weakening familiar axioms for quantifiers
(ǫQ1) ∃t&∀xA(x)→ A(t)
(ǫQ2) ∃t&A(t)→ ∃xA(x)
and adding the axiom
∃xA(x)→ A(ǫxA(x))
A. Dragalin in [1] tried to avoid as much as possible dealing with a value of an
ǫ-term in a world w where the term is not defined. Values (in a given world
w) are assigned only to ǫ-terms defined in w, and many intermediate results
are proved only for the case when all relevant ǫ-terms are defined. Nevertheless
soundness is established for all formulas, without any restrictions. As pointed
earlier, this system is not complete.
In Section 3 we changed the definition of a model from [1] to a more uniform
version: ǫ-term e which is not defined at the world w is assigned a value at
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w, but this value does not belong to the individual domain D(w). To make
this possible, the Kripke frame underlying the model and the domain function
should satisfy additional conditions that still guarantee completeness.
Let us consider other systems in the literature.
6.2 Systems with ∃y(∃xA(x)→ A(y) as Existence Condition
In systems due to to Sh. Maehara and K. Shirai [4, 12], instead of using ∃xA(x)
as a discriminating criterion, a weaker formula ∃y(∃xA(x)→ A(y)) is employed.
This still allows to anticipate a correct future value of the term ǫxA(x) in a world
w even if ∃xA(x) fails in w.
Sh. Maehara treats weaker language than ours: ǫxA(x) is a syntactically
correct term only if it is closed. He proves (using partial cut-elimination and
other syntactic transformations) conservativity over IPC of the rules
Γ, ∃xA(x) A(ǫxA(x)),∆⇒ G
Γ,∆⇒ G
∃ǫ
Γ⇒ t ↓ F (t),∆⇒ G
∀zF (z),Γ,∆⇒ G
Γ⇒ t ↓ ∆→ F (t)
Γ,∆⇒ ∃zF (z) (12)
where
ǫxA(x) ↓:= ∃y(∃xA(x)→ A(y)); a ↓:= ⊤ (13)
Here ⊤ is the constant true, a is an arbitrary variable.
Note that the first of these rules contains a hidden cut. This conservativity
result is used to establish a kind of completeness theorem for IPC over a modi-
fication of Kripke semantics, although this modification is not stated explicitly.
More precisely, Sh. Maehara proves Kripke-style soundness and completeness
result for the relation A ∈ α between formulas A and complete consistent (in his
sense) subsets α of the set of formulas. Only his condition for ∀ is not standard:
∀xA(x) ∈ α↔ (∃B)(B ∈ α&∀β∀t[B ∈ β → (t ∈ Dβ → A(t) ∈ β)])
To establish this condition he uses admissibility of the following rule in his
system:
∃y(∃x¬A(x) → ¬A(y))→ A(ǫx¬A(x))
∀xA(x)
This rules approximates equivalence
∀xA(x)↔ A(ǫx¬A(x))
which is valid only classically.
K. Shirai [12] removes restriction to closed ǫ-terms. He considers a language
with the existence predicate denote by D. Instead of rules used by Maehara he
considers following axioms:
D(t), ∃y(∃xA(x, t)→ A(y, t)⇒ D(ǫxA(x)) (14)
D(t), ∃xA(x, t)⇒ A(ǫxA(x, t), t)
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plus standard modifications of quantifier rules for the system with existence
predicate D.
He proves conservativity of his system over IPC by a combination of a partial
cut-elimination and Maehara’s argument.
D. Leivant [3] and V. Smirnov [14] define logical systems with ǫ-symbol
conservative over IPC by requiring that assumptions discharged in natural de-
duction rules contain no ǫ-symbol. These systems are probably much weaker
than IPCǫ. The system introduced by the author in [9] is certainly weaker
than IPCǫ: a sequent containing subterm ǫxA(x, y) with a bound variable y is
syntactically correct only provided ∀y∃xA(x, y) is a member of the antecedent.
7 Further Work
Complete proof of cut-elimination for IPCǫ and of normal form theorem for NJǫ.
Give a syntactic proof of cut-elimination for IPCǫ and of normalization for
NJǫ.
Provide a semantics for the systems by Sh. Maehara and K. Shirai [4, 12]
and find out whether these systems admit cut-elimination. It seems that the
system by Shirai provides the most general formulation of the idea that ǫ-terms
is partially defined in some arbitrary way. The restriction D(t) allowing to
quantify over value of t can be arbitrary predicate with the only condition (14).
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